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One of the primary functions of the law of evidence is to immunize the
judicial process against the frailties of the jury.' Simultaneously, and de-
rivatively, the evidentiary system attempts to protect the jury from itself,
mitigating the jury's weaknesses by denying it the opportunity to display
them.' Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b),3 the influential modern version
of the traditional rule declaring juror testimony incompetent to impeach a
verdict,4 conspicuously illustrates the incongruity of these ambitions.
Claiming to protect the jury and the judicial process by promoting jury
secrecy, Rule 606(b) eschews the regulation or review of juror misconduct,
instead excluding post-trial juror testimony concerning juror improprieties
1. See P. DEVLIN, TRIAL By JURY 114 (1956) ("The first object of the [English] rules [of evi-
dence] was to prevent the jury from listening to material which it might not know how to value
correctly."); C. MUELLIER & L. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES: TEXT, CASES AND
PROBLEMS 1 (1988) ("mistrust of jurors is the single overriding reason for the law of evidence"); G.
TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAW 93-94 (1971) ("When I took courses on Evidence in law school,
the explanation given for this giant collection of rules was simply that jurors were stupid.... ITIhis
does appear to be the only explanation for the development of this branch of the law."); Cleary,
Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, 5 VAND. L. REV. 277, 282 (1952) (in removing control of
factual determinations from jury, rules of evidence represent "the most careful attempt to control the
processes of communication to be found outside a laboratory").
2. See, e.g., Office of Enforcement, U.S. EPA, The Federal Rules of Evidence Annotated 76
(1980) (no-impeachment rule "shields the jurors from embarrassment when they return a 'dumb ver-
dict' in a case which may have been beyond their competence in the first place").
3. Rule 606(b) states:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any
matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of
anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to
or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connec-
tion therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any
statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from
testifying be received for these purposes.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b). Rule 606(b) departs from the presumption of competency within the Federal
Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 601 (person presumed competent to be witness except as other-
wise provided for in rules or by appropriate state law).
4. See infra note 37 (discussing traditional no-impeachment rule). Uniform Rule 606 is identical
in all relevant respects to Fed. R. Evid. 606, and the majority of states have rules of evidence closely
comparable to 606(b). See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 606[08] (1987
ed. & Supp. 1988).
Unless otherwise noted, this Note addresses both civil and criminal petit juries.
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or errors.5 Indeed, its focus is on protecting the integrity of jury delibera-
tions," the least accessible, most haphazard aspect of jury decision-
making.7 In attempting to cloak serious shortcomings in the jury system
after they have come to fruition, Rule 606(b) seems designed to maximize
the tension between preserving the jury and preserving justice.
This tension has been heightened by a recent judicial construction
which applies the no-impeachment rule of 606(b) to matters or statements
transpiring before deliberations. In Tanner v. United States,8 the Su-
preme Court provided its first full interpretation9 of Rule 606(b), uphold-
ing by a five-to-four decision"0 the exclusion of evidence offered by two
jurors regarding the use by other jurors of marijuana, cocaine, and alcohol
throughout the course of the trial. The majority opinion in Tanner was
criticized harshly by the dissent and subsequently by academic commenta-
5. See Crump, Jury Misconduct, Juy Interviews, and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is the
Broad Exclusionary Principle of Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C.L. REV. 509, 525 (1988) (Rule
606(b) "conceals [an] accommodation ... between an accurate process for seeking truth and a stable
jury system"). Jerome Frank would describe this accommodation as symptomatic of a larger compro-
mise between the popular participation afforded by the jury system and fact-finding. J. FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 136 (1950); see also infra notes
90-92.
6. See Tanner v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2747-48 (1987) (citing arguments against disclo-
sure of deliberations in support of expansive reading of Rule 606(b)); id. at 2756-57 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing authority to suggest focus on deliberations); FED. R.
EVID. 606 advisory committee's note ("The values sought to be promoted by excluding the evidence
include freedom of deliberation, stability and finality of verdicts, and protection of jurors against an-
noyance and embarrassment."); 3 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 290, at 151
(1979) ("[b]y its terms, Rule 606(b) is simply inapplicable" to using testimony or affidavits of jurors
relating to matters occurring before or after deliberations); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Lead-
ing Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 255 (1987) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
7. See infra note 92.
8. 107 S. Ct. 2739 (1987).
9. The Supreme Court had previously considered the common law rule against jury impeachment
of verdicts. See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-69 (1915) (general rule that losing party
cannot use testimony of jurors to impeach verdict); Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 383-84
(1912) (testimony of jurors should not be received to show compromise verdict or other matters which
essentially inhere in verdict); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 147-50 (1892) (testimony of
jurors may be received to show overt acts such as bailiff's comments to jurors and introduction of
newspaper into jury room).
These cases were cited in Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2746, as was Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209
(1982), which did not consider either the common law rule or Rule 606(b). Surprisingly, the Court
did not cite the only previous Supreme Court case that refers to Rule 606(b), Rushen v. Spain, 464
U.S. 114 (1983). In Rushen, the Court endorsed a state court judgment on acceptable juror testimony
and squared it with Rule 606(b) in a manner which seems directly at odds with the decision in
Tanner. Compare Rushen, 464 U.S. at 121 n.5 (allowing juror testimony at motion for new trial
"concerning any mental bias in matters unrelated to the specific issues that the juror was called upon
to decide" and approving lower court's exclusion of evidence relating to juror's mental attitude in
determining verdict) with Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2750-51 (prohibiting juror testimony impeaching
verdict except for that concerning outside influence).
10. Justice O'Connor's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Pow-
ell, and Scalia, while Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, dissented
to the part of the opinion addressing Rule 606(b).
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tors for its narrow reading of the exceptions to Rule 606(b)11 and for its
temporal extension of the Rule to pre-deliberations events.12
While Tanner is perhaps correctly denounced for its aggressive reading
of Rule 606(b), critics of the decision and the Rule have failed to chal-
lenge the evidentiary system's underlying vision of the ineluctably froward
jury. Instead, discussion focuses on alternative means of securing evidence
of misconduct (and abiding by Rule 606(b)), 3 more effective ways of pro-
tecting the jury (and slighting Rule 606(b)), 4 and subject-matter excep-
tions necessary to make the general exclusion of testimony under 606(b)
tolerable. 15 The Court's decision in Tanner, however, suggests a very dif-
ferent line of inquiry. By excluding juror complaints about the compe-
tency of other jurors in an effort to improve the integrity of jury delibera-
tions, Tanner helps expose the evidentiary system's inherently limited
comprehension of the jury system and the problem of juror misconduct.
Equally significant, Tanner's extension of Rule 606(b) to pre-
deliberations juror activities highlights a useful distinction between the ev-
identiary system's proscriptive concern for the integrity of jury delibera-
tions and the prescriptive potential for pre-deliberations jury activity.
This Note employs the new application of Rule 606(b) to pre-delibera-
tions events to forge a more coherent approach to juror competency. Sec-
tion I briefly reviews the underlying problem of juror misconduct ad-
dressed by the no-impeachment rule. Section II demonstrates that while
juror testimony about pre-deliberations matters or statements does not
compromise Rule 606(b)'s concern for the jury system, the benefits of that
testimony are sharply limited by the constraints imposed by the eviden-
tiary system. Section III compares the limited evidential functions de-
manded of jurors by Rule 606(b) to the potential breadth of juror roles.
Finally, Section IV suggests concrete means for improving the jury system
preserved by Rule 606(b) by using jurors to minimize juror misconduct.
I. RULE 606(b) AND THE PROBLEM OF JUROR MISCONDUCT
Although the traditional no-impeachment rule and Rule 606(b) theoret-
ically apply to all subjects for testimony by jurors, the vast majority of
11. See Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2758-59 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Crump, supra note 5, at 523-25; Leading Cases, supra note 6, at 255.
12. See Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2756-58 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
3 D. LOUISEI. & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 287, 290 (Supp. 1988); Leading Cases,
supra note 6, at 254-55.
13. See, e.g., Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2751.
14. See Crump, supra note 5, at 526-29, 539-42; Developments in the Law-Race and the
Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1599 (1988) [hereinafter Developments].
15. See, e.g., Carlson & Sumberg, AttackingJury Verdicts: Paradigms for Rule Revision, 1977
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 247 (proposing exception for threats or acts of violence in jury room); Developments,
supra note 14, at 1595-1603 (proposing exception for racist juror misconduct); Note, Judgment By
Your Peers? The Impeachment of Jury Verdicts and the Case of the Insane Juror, 21 N.Y.L.F. 57
(1975) (proposing close review of allegedly insane jurors).
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cases implicating those rules concern misconduct by or toward the jury.
Indeed, given that Rule 606(b) allows testimony relating to "extraneous
prejudicial information" and "outside influences," it tends to prohibit tes-
timony alleging misconduct by jurors."6 Since no empirical work has docu-
mented the extent of juror misconduct,17 it is difficult to estimate the de-
gree to which claims excluded by Rule 606(b) understate or overstate the
misbehavior of jurors.
Nonetheless, several tentative conclusions are warranted. First, cases in-
volving affirmative misconduct by jurors are legion in number and vari-
ety. 8 Second, the legal consequences of reported misconduct changed sig-
nificantly upon adoption of Rule 606(b), suggesting that no-impeachment
rules have a material impact on the finality of judgment in jury trials.1 9
Third, the appellate records of states which allow relatively unconstrained
impeachment of verdicts for juror misconduct confirm the high incidence
of misconduct and the impact of no-impeachment rules.2"
16. See H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974); 3 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 287 (1979 & Supp. 1988); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4,
606[04] at 606-33 to -50.
17. See Berg, Juror Misconduct Gets Closer Look As Trials Lengthen, L.A. Daily J., Sept. 8,
1987, at 1, col. 2 (little research done on volume of juror misconduct). The lack of data may be due to
the bias of researchers in favor of trial by jury and to the sheer difficulty of observing juror miscon-
duct given the variety of rules protecting jury secrecy. See Baldwin & McConville, Doubtful Convic-
tions By Jury, 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 230, 230-31, 238; see also infra note 91 (inscrutability of
deliberations).
18. See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 454 A.2d 770, 772-73 (D.C. App. 1982) (nine jurors petition
judge to replace foreperson for drinking during deliberations), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 972 (1983),
reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 1064 (1984); FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DIGEST Rule 606(b) (1985 ed.
& Supp. 1988) (compiling 606(b) cases); NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, INC., JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC
TECHNIQUES § 8.2, at 151-53 (2d ed. 1983) (detailing variety and instances of juror misconduct);
Jurors Give Nod to Retrial, A.B.A. J., June 1, 1987, at 18, 19 ($460,000 jury verdict overturned
where several jurors slept during presentation of evidence mitigating damage to karate and judo in-
structor's knees); A Juror in a Compromising Position?, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 11, 1982, at 31, col. 2 (death
sentence upheld despite attempts by juror to date friend of accused during trial); The Tipsy Scales of
Justice, Nat'l L.J., May 18, 1981, at 35, col. 1 (mistrial declared in rape case where two intoxicated
jurors refused to proceed with deliberations); see also Edwards, A Judge's Review of Juror Miscon-
duct, 27 How. L.J. 1519, 1526-44 (1984); Fairlie, Juror Non-Disclosure in Criminal Cases: A
Threat to Justice, TRIAL, June 1983, at 73; Comment, To Impeach or Not to Impeach: The Stability
of Juror Verdicts in Federal Courts, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 343, 351-64 (1977); Hellenbrand &
Giordano, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts: A Guide for Misconduct Claim, N.Y.L.J., May 26, 1981,
at 1, col. 2.
19. One well-documented case is Texas, which adopted Rule 606(b) in 1983. See Robinson Elec.
Supply Co. v. Cadillac Cable Corp., 706 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (Rule 606(b) elimi-
nated previously admissible testimony concerning "overt acts" by jurors during deliberations); Addi-
son, Conduct Unbecoming a jury: Rule 606(b), 50 TEX. BAR. J. 872, 872 (1987) (Texas's adoption
of Rule 606(b) represents "a big change from prior Texas law," and "a very strict standard. No
Texas case yet has found an 'outside influence' under the new rules."). But see Texas Rules of Evi-
dence Handbook, 20 Hous. L. REV. 1, 419 (1983) (citing estimate that Texas Supreme Court had
reversed only two cases during previous twenty-five years on grounds of juror misconduct); Boyd, The
Current State of Jury Misconduct Claims in Texas Civil Cases, 21 S. TEX. L.J. 23, 23-24 (1980)
(three of fifty-nine cases appealing alleged juror misconduct succeeded in obtaining remand for new
trial). See generally Comment, The Room Without a View: Inquiries into Jury Misconduct After the
Adoption of Texas Rule of Evidence 606(b), 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 965 (1986) (canvassing Texas
experience with no-impeachment rule).
20. See, e.g., Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Cal. 3d 388, 407-18, 650 P.2d 1171, 1183-90 (1982)
(comprehensive review of California juror misconduct law; $9.2 million verdict upheld despite admis-
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This evidence supports the judgment of one observer that "[plerhaps the
greatest area of conflict between the view of the jury as an institution
dispensing community justice on an ad hoc basis, as opposed to an organ
of truth, arises in post-trial challenges to a verdict based on juror miscon-
duct or impropriety."21 In moderating this conflict in criminal proceed-
ings, Rule 606(b) affects critical components of the Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial, including the right to confront adverse witnesses, 22 the
right to trial by an impartial jury,2 3 and the careful division of constitu-
tional authority between judge and jury.24 The same conflict in the civil
setting causes Rule 606(b) to moderate the Seventh Amendment right to
trial by jury and the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee.25
Given the general climate of secrecy surrounding jury deliberations, it is
not surprising that many of the unveiled incidents of misconduct involve
pre-deliberations behavior by jurors,28 of which Tanner v. United States
is exemplary. The defendants in Tanner were convicted of conspiring to
defraud the United States and committing several acts of mail fraud. Prior
to sentencing, they filed a motion seeking permission to interview jurors,
an evidentiary hearing, and a new trial. The defendants based their re-
quest on unsolicited information from a juror who alleged that several
jurors had consumed alcohol at lunch breaks throughout the trial, causing
them to sleep through the afternoons. The district court held that juror
testimony on intoxication was inadmissible under Rule 606(b) and denied
the motion for new trial. The court later denied similar motions based on
unsolicited information from a second juror who observed during the trial
regular marijuana and alcohol use by four jurors, repeated cocaine use by
sions that three jurors worked crossword puzzles and one juror read novel throughout testimony); see
also Note, Crossword Puzzles and Novels: The Impact of Hasson v. Ford on Jury Misconduct, 5
GLENDALE L. REV. 215 (1983) (criticizing decision).
21. Thompson, Challenge to the Decisionmaking Process-Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and
the Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial, 38 Sw. L.J. 1187, 1195 (1985).
22. See, e.g., Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966) (bailiff's statements to sequestered
jurors violated confrontation clause); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965) (contact between
witnesses and jurors deprived defendant of right to fair trial).
23. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-28 (1961) (publicity surrounding trial of alleged
mass murderer denied defendant fair and impartial trial).
24. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 19-22 (1955) (ex-serviceman uncon-
stitutionally subjected to trial by court-martial).
25. See Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1535 & 1535-36 nn.4-5 (4th Cir.
1986) (unauthorized communication to jurors during trial raises presumption of prejudice to civil
litigant's constitutional rights to impartial jury).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Key, 717 F.2d 1206, 1209 (8th Cir. 1983) (refusal to grant mistrial
or replace juror upheld where veteran juror who appeared asleep during closing arguments and in-
structions was held to be closing his eyes in order to listen); United States v. Widgery, 636 F.2d 200,
203 n.7 (8th Cir. 1980) (refusal to grant mistrial upheld where only evidence of juror misconduct
consisted of allegation that juror had been "'blowing kisses, winking [and] waving'" to assistant
prosecutor); People v. Rosenthal, 370 11. 244, 18 N.E.2d 450 (1938) (two jurors convicted of con-
tempt for violating sequestration order with ten other jurors by commandeering court-provided bus to
make disorderly tour of taverns); Reversal Cites Sequestration Explanation, Nat'l L.J., June 7, 1982,
at 13, col. I (murder conviction in Brooklyn Supreme Court overturned where jurors and court of-
ricers allegedly drank and engaged in sexual relations during trial); see also supra notes 18, 20.
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-two jurors, the sale of marijuana between jurors, and other behavior lead-
ing him to describe the jury as "one big party." ' The Eleventh Circuit
and the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of testimony by both
jurors.28
II. RULE 606(b) AND PRE-DELIBERATIONS MATTERS AND
STATEMENTS: THE LIMITS OF PROSCRIPTION
Careful examination of the Supreme Court's contestable application of
Rule 606(b) to pre-deliberations activities in Tanner reveals the inherent
limits of the present regime in controlling juror misconduct. This section
demonstrates that while pre-deliberations matters and statements are not
addressed by Rule 606(b), and testimony about such activities does not
threaten jury deliberations or the health of the jury system, the demands
of proof and finality imposed by Rule 606(b) and the evidentiary system
may inevitably constrain consideration of juror testimony concerning such
misconduct.
A. The Language and History of Rule 606(b)
The Tanner opinions29 and subsequent discussions of the case3" focus
on the appellants' claim that the use of drugs and alcohol by jurors consti-
tuted an "outside influence" under Rule 606(b). The text and legislative
history of Rule 606(b) concur, however, in a more comprehensive answer
to the problem.posed by the juror behavior encountered in Tanner. The
language of Rule 606(b) seems solely concerned with limiting impeach-
ment based on juror testimony about deliberations: Not only must the af-
fected testimony report either a matter or statement occurring during de-
liberations or the effect of something upon deliberations-specific
activities,3 but the exceptions to the Rule only make sense if "outside
influence" is understood as a complement to the accepted sphere for jury
deliberations.3 2 The legislative history clearly supports the deliberations
delimitation as well,33 in marked contrast to the ambiguous congressional
27. 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2743-45 (1987).
28. United States v. Conover, 772 F.2d 765 (11th Cir. 1985), affd in part and remanded in
part, Tanner v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2739 (1987).
29. Compare id. at 2746-49 with id. at 2754, 2758 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
30. See Crump, supra note 5, at 510-11, 523-25; Party Time, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1, 1987, at 58, 60.
Cf United States v. Schultz, 656 F. Supp. 1218, 1221 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (regardless of possible
answer forthcoming in Tanner, consideration of right of defendant to competent jury necessitates
classifying "use of drugs to the point of incapacity" as outside influence under Rule 606(b)).
31. See supra note 6.
32. An alternative construction that distinguishes influences originating in the jury room from
those originating outside was specifically rejected by the Advisory Committee. See FED. R. EvID. 606
advisory committee's note ("the door of the jury room is not necessarily a satisfactory dividing point
. .."). In either case, the testimony refused by the Court in Tanner would be acceptable, since it
related to misconduct occurring "outside" the jury room.
33. See Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2757-58 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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discussion of certain other terms found in the rule."' Finally, notwith-
standing the majority opinion in Tanner, other Supreme Court and cir-
cuit court decisions provide precedent for the deliberations limitation.
35
Tanner and its satellites may well eclipse this perspective."
B. The Purposes of the No-Impeachment Rule
Since the Tanner interpretation of Rule 606(b) may further the Rule's
underlying ambitions, it is valuable to test the fidelity of impeaching ver-
dicts based on pre-deliberations matters or statements to the purpose of
the traditional no-impeachment rule: secrecy of jury deliberations.3 A
close look reveals that the no-impeachment rule's extension could only be
While Justice Marshall alluded to the developing focus on jury deliberations in the House and Senate
resolutions, the evolution began much earlier. The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference changed successive drafts of Rule 606(b) to heighten emphasis on jury delib-
erations. Compare 51 F.R.D. 315, 386-87 (1971) (only "effect" clause) with 56 F.R.D. 183, 264-65
(1972) (adding "during the course of the jury's deliberations" clause and exceptions thereto). These
changes were directly responsive to congressional concern that Rule 606 allowed inquiry into jury
deliberations. See 117 CONG. REc. 33642, 33645 (1971) (letter from Sen. McClellan to Judge Mars,
Chairman of the Committee on Rules); Rules of Evidence: Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence
Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 314, 315 (1973) [hereinafter Hearings] (reply from Advisory Commit-
tee official stating that "[tIhe present Rule (6061 has been substantially rewritten in a fashion that
meets your criticisms").
34. See supra notes 29-30 (controversy over "outside influence").
35. See supra note 9 (contrasting Rushen v. Spain with Tanner v. United States); Isaacs v.
Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482, 1484-85 n.6 (11th Cir. 1985) (testimony by juror in habeas corpus proceeding
as to misconduct by another juror not barred by 606(b) where testimony concerns conduct before
deliberations), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986); Sullivan v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 465, 467 (2d Cir. 1980)
(inquiry by trial court into juror's statements relating to delusions occurring during trial permissible
and required). But see Government of the Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1075, 1079-81
(3d Cir. 1985) (barring juror testimony as to inability to hear trial); United States v. Schultz, 656 F.
Supp. 1218, 1221 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (standard for evidentiary hearing on juror misconduct does not
depend on time of misconduct).
36. See, e.g., Neron v. Tierney, 841 F.2d 1197, 1205 (1st Cir. 1988) (while Rule 606(b) does not
bar juror testimony concerning alleged affair between juror and defendant prior to trial, Tanner and
like cases indicate general governmental interest in preventing post-trial hearings on juror bias, mis-
conduct, or extraneous influence); Urseth v. City of Dayton, 680 F. Supp. 1084, 1089 (S.D. Ohio
1987) (Rule 606(b) does not pertain to allegations of juror perjury on voir dire, but generally excludes
"statements made by a juror during deliberations (or prior thereto)").
37. The original common-law no-impeachment rule was based less on policy than on a behavioral
assumption. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2352, at 696 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (explaining
Lord Mansfield's creation of no-impeachment rule in Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B.
1785), as extension of rule that no person shall be heard to allege his own turpitude); see also Carlson
& Sumberg, supra note 15, at 248-58 (tracing history of common law rule). Despite wholesale
changes in justification and form, the no-impeachment rule has always retained a focus on jury delib-
erations. See Thompson, supra note 21, passim.
Remarkably, even juror privilege, a divergent strain of the no-impeachment rule emphasizing the
individual prerogative of the juror, recognizes the deliberations limitation. See Comment, Juror Privi-
lege: The Answer to the Impeachment Puzzle?, 3 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 447, 449-50 (1981) (urging
renewal of juror privilege doctrine); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra, § 2346, at 678 (conditions for privilege
only "fully satisfied for communications among jurors during retirement"). Similarly, attempts to
articulate a privacy interest for jurors have suggested a deliberations limitation. See Capital Cities
Media, Inc. v. Toole, 463 U.S. 1303, 1306 (1983) (Brennan, Circuit Judge) (dismissing State's con-
cern for juror privacy as "attenuated after the jury brings in its verdict and is discharged"); United
States v. Franklin, 546 F. Supp. 1133, 1142 (N.D. Ind. 1982) ("[jlurors have a fundamental right to
retain as a part of their own privacy the contents of deliberation").
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based on an exaggerated sense of both the jury's fragility and the curative
properties of the evidentiary system.
First, the no-impeachment rule is intended to protect members of the
jury from harassment by a losing party intent on discovering evidence that
impugns the jury finding. 8 But jurors are not the exclusive or even pre-
ferred sources of evidence for pre-deliberations matters or statements:
Other parties may observe jury behavior before deliberations, 9 and their
testimony would not encounter either the limitations of the "effect" clause
of Rule 606(b) 40 or the power of the court to restrict jury interviewing.4
Given this loophole, and the evident willingness of jurors to volunteer in-
formation, a rule incorporating all pre-deliberations matters and state-
ments seems overbroad."2 Moreover, it is likely to be ineffective, since the
ambiguity of the other exceptions to Rule 606(b) permits good faith at-
tempts to discover evidence relating to an "outside influence."' 3
Second, regardless of the level of investigation by parties, the disclosure
entailed by post-verdict impeachment is thought to chill deliberations.
44
While the prospect of being the subject of testimony by one's fellow jurors
might marginally contribute to a less cooperative jury room, a rule barring
testimony about anything occurring in the course of a jury's deliberations
would assuage any detrimental effect on deliberations. 4' Moreover, there
is reason to doubt the significance of any evidential rule: Unanimity rules
mean that individual votes will be publicly available in any event;46 jurors
38. See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915).
39. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2744 (1987) (observations of counsel and
trial judge).
40. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., S.D. ALA. R. 12 (prohibiting juror interrogation without court permission); N.D.
ALA. R. 10 (prohibiting juror interrogation prior to day following release from jury service); M.D.
ALA. R. 9 (prohibiting juror interrogation with reference to jury verdict or deliberations without
formal petition and permission of court). Cf Crump, supra note 5, at 525-29 (little uniformity in
interviewing rules).
42. See In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1982) (Rule 606(b) does not
justify and First Amendment forbids court order prohibiting press interviews of jurors where "[tihe
rule is unlimited in time and in scope, applying equally to jurors willing and anxious to speak and to
jurors desiring privacy, forbidding both courteous as well as uncivil communications, and foreclosing
questions about a juror's general reactions as well as specific questions about other juror's votes");
Note, Constitutional Law: Rule Prohibiting Impeachment of Verdicts by Jurors as Deprivation of
Due Process, 14 OKLA. L. REV. 533, 535-36 (1961).
43. See supra notes 29-30; infra note 67 and accompanying text; see also Developments, supra
note 14, at 1599 ("existing exceptions to rule 606(b) ...already give defeated parties a means for
harassing jurors").
44. Disruption of jury secrecy might affect deliberations in two ways. First, open discussion and
debate might be discouraged, since jurors would risk public appraisal of their opinions. See Clark v.
United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915). Second,
"juries may be intimidated into rendering certain verdicts by the specter of subsequent pressures."
Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARV. L. REV. 886, 890 (1983).
45. See Leading Cases, supra note 6, at 258 ("admitting juror testimony about activities that
occur before the actual deliberations in no way compromises this interest"). Even so, juror relation-
ships may be poisoned by early distrust.
46. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 48 (parties may stipulate to majority verdict) with FED. R. CRINI.
P. 31(a) (unanimous verdict required).
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are generally free to report votes and deliberations to all who will listen;4
and jurors may be unaware of any of these possibilities and thus unaf-
fected in their deliberations. 48 Under these circumstances, it seems exces-
sive to exclude testimony on pre-deliberations matters or statements. 49
Third, the no-impeachment rule seeks to prevent individual jurors from
channeling dissatisfaction with the majority view into a public distortion
of the deliberations, thus abusing jury secrecy and decreasing the incentive
to deliberate in good faith.5" Of course, the no-impeachment rule cannot
deter jurors from seeking non-legal vindication of minority views through
appeals to the public, and forcing such commentary outside the courtroom
denies the court the use of perjury penalties against jurors who intend to
misrepresent the content of deliberations." More important, such fraud is
much less likely and less dangerous with regard to pre-deliberations mat-
ters or statements, since in those situations the juror may not exploit the
secrecy of the deliberations but must aver to relatively open events.52
Finally, juror impeachment is thought to threaten public faith in the
jury system and in the administration of justice,53 thus detracting from a
recognized objective of evidence law.54 But excluding evidence of juror
misconduct for this reason treads a narrow line: While decreasing incen-
tives for discovering such misconduct helps to maintain a facade of re-
spectability, that facade is marred when misconduct is alleged and the no-
47. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
48. See Developments, supra note 14, at 1599 (open discussion not likely to be discouraged unless
knowledge of precise rules for admissibility implausibly assumed); Comment, Impeachment of Jury
Verdicts, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 360, 365 (1958).
49. See United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 664-65 (2d Cir. 1978) (Rule 606(b) "yields to the
need for juror testimony in situations where there is a reduced potential for harassment or embarrass-
ment of jurors"). Cf. Crump, supra note 5, at 536 (606(b) "A Blunderbuss Rather than a Scalpel").
50. See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148 (1892); United States v. Eagle, 539 F.2d
1166, 1170 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1110 (1976).
The problem of juror misrepresentation may be exaggerated. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,
217 n.7 (1982) (juror testimony at impeachment hearings not inherently suspect); see also Comment,
supra note 48, at 364 (jurors have no more motive to lie than other witnesses). But see 3 D. Lout-
SELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 6, § 286, at 114 (reluctant jurors may be persuaded by defeated
parties that their consent somehow resulted from "false or impermissible considerations"). Justice
Marshall has suggested that the most likely distortion is suppression of wrongdoing during post-trial
testimony, since jurors will be reluctant to admit impairment of the verdict. Smith v. Phillips, 455
U.S. at 230 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Neither side to the dispute provides extensive support for its position, nor considers the variables
introduced by the post-trial perspectives and procedures which most immediately influence a juror's
testimony. See, e.g., J. GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 100-01 (1988) (surveying studies sug-
gesting that juror dedication to jury system increases markedly after service).
51. The threat of perjury, however, need not prevent ajuror witness from testifying. Cf. Herring
v. Blankenship, 662 F. Supp. 557, 566 (W.D. Va. 1987) (grant of immunity recommended where
juror witness to outside influence may have refused to confirm affidavit for fear of perjury).
52. Moreover, pre-deliberations reporting may precede the development of intra-jury antagonism
during deliberations. See V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 108-09 (1986) (personal and
evidentiary conflicts develop during deliberations).
53. See Broeder, The Functions of the Juty: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 386, 417-19
(1954); Note, supra note 44, at 891-92.
54. See Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts,
98 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1357-68 (1985).
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impeachment rule helps sustain the verdict.55 In other words, the prophy-
lactic effect has to outweigh the immediate effect of declaring already-
disclosed misconduct moot.5 The pre-deliberations exception may mediate
the two results by allowing impeachment of matters or statements that
court officers may contemporaneously observe and remedy, thus preserv-
ing the option of concealment.
57
C. Proof
Unfortunately, Rule 606(b)'s literal and functional compatibility with
juror testimony on pre-deliberations misconduct does not end the problems
posed by the present evidentiary regime. The threshold difficulty is that
606(b) bars proof of "the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's
mind," 58 probably even proof of the effect of those matters or statements
established by testimony falling into the explicit exceptions within the rule
for "extraneous prejudicial information" and "outside influences. '59 In-
deed, this limitation is at the heart of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Tan-
ner,60 and the failure of the dissent to address the "effect" clause in rela-
tion to a pre-deliberations exception may be fatal to its interpretation of
606(b).6 1
Courts have resisted the response of presuming prejudice upon a show-
ing of misconduct, a compromise which could reconcile concern for juror
misconduct with jury secrecy. However, not only would a presumption
risk overturning verdicts for trivial misconduct,62 but it would present the
55. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 14, at 1600 (reports of racist jurors rendering unimpeach-
able verdicts have "demoralizing effect on public confidence").
56. See id. at 1600 (asserting that rule permitting exposure of racist deliberations will increase
public trust in criminal justice system).
57. Relatively autonomous court options include the use of alternate jurors, see infra notes
103-04 and accompanying text; and sua sponte orders for new trial, see FED. R. Civ. P. 59(d). See,
e.g., Nissho-Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, 729 F.2d 1530, 1538 (5th Cir. 1984) (trial court
justified in retrying all issues where juror questioned by judge indicated confusion over instructions
and confusion reflected in damage award). But cf. FED. R. CRiM. P. 33 advisory committee note on
1966 amendment (judge without power to order new trial on own motion in criminal matters).
58. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
59. See FED. R. EvID. 606(b) (disjunctive "deliberations" and "effects" clauses); see also Wiede-
mann v. Galiano, 722 F.2d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 1983) (trial court's consideration of juror testimony
concerning role of unadmitted syringe in jury deliberations reversible error); United States v.
Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 884-85 (9th Cir. 1981) (jury may not be questioned about effects of extra-
neous information obtained from business publications), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962 (1982); United
States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383, 1385 n.2 (10th Cir. 1980) (judge erred in allowing jurors to be asked
about fidelity to instructions and oath at hearing on extraneous communication of sentencing informa-
tion). But see Krause v. Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563, 570 (6th Cir. 1977) (propriety of questioning juror
about effect of extraneous influences not settled by Rule 606(b)), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978).
60. 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2748 (1987).
61. See United States v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210, 243-44 (7th Cir. 1986) (while Rule 606(b)
does not literally prohibit testimony regarding juror communications during trial, effect clause renders
hearing "fruitless" unless presumed prejudicial); see also 3 J. WEINSTEIN AND M. BERGER, supra
note 4, at 606[05] n.1 (compiling like cases).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1981) (criticizing dispute
over presumption of prejudice arising from outside influence as leading "down the road to absurd-
ity"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 455 U.S. 926 (1982).
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party defending the verdict with the difficult task of overcoming the pre-
sumption with evidence which is not itself barred by Rule 606(b).6" Cou-
pled with the difficulty of proving "effect," the resulting conundrum of
proof has led to considerable confusion as to whether a presumption at-
taches even in cases involving third party interference.64 The reigning
standard appears to inquire into the likelihood that misconduct affected
the verdict but without the benefit of a default rule or competent
evidence.65
The uncertainty surrounding the burden of proof 6 means that con-
cerned parties will find it hard to estimate ex ante whether they possess
meritorious claims. Some may therefore press ultimately unsuccessful
claims that nonetheless expose juror misconduct and destroy secrecy. 7 On
the other hand, the slim prospects for prevailing might deter the conscien-
tious attorney from investigating allegations of misconduct and thus fore-
close the possibility of proof even in those situations the Tanner court
would deem prejudicial.6 8
63. See 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 12, at § 291.
64. See Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377, 381-82 (1956) (bribe presumed prejudicial);
Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1536-37 (4th Cir. 1986) (nonjuror participation
presumed prejudicial); Sullivan v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 465, 467 (2d Cir. 1980) (jury tampering presump-
tively prejudicial); Herring v. Blankenship, 662 F. Supp. 557, 563-65 (W.D. Va. 1987) (outside
influence presumed prejudicial). But see United States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383, 1385 n.1 (10th Cir.
1980) (while contact between marshal and juror presumed prejudicial, "[t]his effect of Rule 606(b)
may require the courts to narrow the definition of 'presumptively prejudicial' found in [Remmer]");
Development, Smith v. Phillips: Misconduct By or Affecting a Juror in a Criminal Prosecution, 62
B.U.L. REV. 361, 381-84 (1982) (suggesting that Smith v. Phillips created doubt as to scope of
Remmer by its lenient review of state misconduct hearing where plaintiff had burden of proof).
65. See 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 12, at § 291.
66. See United States v. Bassler, 651 F.2d 600, 601-603 (8th Cir.) (test for prejudice of outside
influence disputed), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 944 (1981), 454 U.S. 115 (1982); Crump, supra note 5, at
530-31 (lack of uniformity in procedure for reviewing evidence of juror misconduct); Saltzburg,
Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1983 A.B.A. SEc. LITIG. 142 (inconsis-
tency among cases admitting evidence of outside influence).
67. See 3 D. LoUISEL. & C. MUELLER, supra note 6, at § 291 ("exceptions to the principle (and
areas beyond its reach) are significant enought [sic] to encourage parties dissatisfied with verdicts to
enlist the aid of jurors in post-verdict attacks"). But see Comment, supra note 48, at 365 (litigation
may be constrained "where fairly precise definition of the grounds of impeachment is possi-
ble"-including verdicts decided by lot, juror's personal knowledge, and extraneous influences).
68. Notwithstanding the possibility that complaints may be deemed waived if not made during
trial, see, e.g., Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 661 F. Supp. 1448, 1480 (D.
Wyo. 1987) (party waived objection to poem written by juror by waiting until after verdict returned);
attorneys are restricted in the investigations they may conduct during trial, and may be impaired in
collecting information about pre-deliberations matters and statements even after trial. See supra note
41 (restrictions on jury interviews); Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2750 (attorney barred from interviewing
jurors after trial); see also 3 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 6, at § 291 (discussing tension
between waiver rule and ban on investigation); Party Time, supra note 30, at 60 (quoting counsel for
defendants in Tanner as noting that decision "puts a difficult burden on trial counsel" to uncover
misconduct by jurors, since "[y]ou cannot communicate with the jury in any way during the trial, but
you have to bring the issue out at trial or the issue is closed").
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D. Finality
The difficulty of rooting Tanner in a concern for protecting the jury
suggests a second agenda for Rule 606(b), encouraging finality of judg-
ment.69 In Learned Hand's words, with unlimited impeachment "judges
...would become Penelopes, forever engaged in unravelling the webs
they wove."
'70
Since finality is weakened by all forms of post-verdict inquiry, not just
those relying on juror testimony,71 it is difficult to consider it dispositive in
this instance.72 Moreover, the conflict may be forced by the binary choice
within the evidentiary system between admitting or excluding the evi-
dence. Finality might be encouraged with few attendant costs if a means
to reduce juror misconduct and therefore the need for post-verdict im-
peachment were found. Reduced misconduct would also lessen uncertainty
about finality by decreasing the number of petitions for post-trial hearings
and for new trials arising from post-trial revelations. Before such a regime
can be made successful, it is necessary to rehabilitate the sullied role of
jurors.
III. THE ROLE OF JURORS IN CURING JUROR MISCONDUCT
While juror insights are now frequently employed in relatively uncon-
structive ventures,73 the evidentiary system has disdained juror assistance,
a posture consonant with its limited regard for the jury and dissonant
with a fuller understanding of the jury's performance and potential.
A. The Present Role of Jurors
It is hardly surprising that those confronted with juror aberrancies re-
gard juries with a benign paternalism.74 Even so, the continued prevalence
of juror misconduct 7 5 suggests that attempts at jury supervision have been
ineffective. The Supreme Court's assertion in Tanner regarding the effec-
tiveness of the trial process in protecting the Sixth Amendment right to an
unimpaired jury76 was singularly unpersuasive: None of the cases cited by
69. See FED. R. EvID. 606 advisory committee's note, quoted supra note 6; see also Tanner v.
United States, 107 S. Ct. at 2747-48; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 68, at 165-66 (E. Cleary 3d ed.
1984) (no-impeachment rule's survival attributable to protection of finality).
70. Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764
(1947).
71. See Sullivan v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 465, 468 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee's note ("simply putting verdicts beyond effective
reach can only promote irregularity and injustice").
73. See, e.g., Chambers, Little Room on juriesfor Profit Motive, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 25, 1988, at 13,
col. 4 (sale of accounts by jurors in Bernhard Goetz, Pennzoil-Texaco, CBS-Westmoreland, and
Howard Beach trials).
74. See, e.g., Buchwald, Inside the Jury Room, LITIGATION, Fall 1980, at 44; Weiner, Avoiding
the Big Sleep, LITIGATION, Spring 1988, at 22; Jury Toys, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 8, 1982, at 35, col. 1.
75. See notes 18, 26 and accompanying text.
76. See 107 S. Ct. at 2751.
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the Court resulted in control of juror misconduct;" the court officers pur-
portedly surveying the jury are as frequently cited for interference with
jurors as for policing their conduct;78 and the trial judge in the underlying
case specifically stated that he was "not going to take on [the] responsibil-
ity" of monitoring jurors.
7 9
The performance of the court and bar might be improved by strength-
ening their codes of conduct80 and utilizing their capacity to prevent re-
peated misconduct.8" Even so, the very rationales for Rule 606(b) suggest
that supervision will continue to be ineffective. The same attorneys en-
trusted with monitoring the jury are thought to pose a risk of jury tam-
pering if juror testimony is permitted.82 For their part, trial judges may
have to overcome their preference for finality in order to remedy
misconduct.
8 3
B. The Potential Role for Jurors
Despite the suppression of jurors by Rule 606(b), the slight role pre-
served for them is encouraging. Most importantly, the vast majority of
Rule 606(b) disputes arise because of information spontaneously brought
to the attention of judge or counsel by a juror with no obvious stake in the
outcome.8 When Rule 606(b) is found to be inapplicable and prejudice
77. See United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899
(1980); United States v. Taliaferro, 558 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1977); Lee v. United States, 454 A.2d 770
(D.C. App. 1982).
78. Compare Provenzano, 620 F.2d at 996-97 (marshal discovers sequestered juror smoking ma-
rijuana) with Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 212-13 (1982) (prosecuting attorneys learning of ju-
ror's application for employment with District Attorney's Office fail to report information to judge or
opposing counsel) and Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 363-64 (1966) (bailiff describes defendant
as "guilty" and "wicked" to juror) and Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 142 (1892) (bailiff
informs jury that defendant previously killed two others) and Haugh v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 101 F.R.D. 88, 90 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (marshal tells jurors that they will be "locked up until the
verdict") and People v. Rosenthal, 370 Ill. 244, 246 (1938) (deputy sheriff and bailiff carouse with
jurors and commandeer bus) and Nat'l L.J., supra note 26, at 13 (court officer drinks with and
sleeps with juror).
79. See Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2759 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY DR 7-108, EC 7-32 (1983) (ex-
horting lawyers to reveal improper conduct by or toward juror) with MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT 241 (Proposed Final Draft, May 30, 1981) ("There seems no basis for singling out
one form of misbehavior that a lawyer is obliged to report."). The Model Code of Judicial Conduct
also fails to consider the issue. But see 3 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 15-3.7 (2d ed.
1980) (approximating "outside influence" standard of Rule 606(b)).
81. Compare United States v. Key, 717 F.2d 1206, 1209 (8th Cir. 1983) (veteran juror routinely
appears asleep during trials) with Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274, 280-81 (9th Cir. 1958) (use
of jury book by government counsel to record past performance of jurors), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 916
(1959). The court may strike potential jurors from the jury roll if it determines that the juror's service
would be likely to affect the secrecy or integrity of jury deliberations, a determination that would seem
warranted by a record of previous misconduct. See 28 U.S.C. 1866(c)(5) (1982); H.R. REP. No. 1076,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1792, 1793 (exclusions
must be made based on objective criteria).
82. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2744 (1987). Probably the best compen-
dium of recent 606(b) cases is the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DIGEST, supra note 18, Rule
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determined, the juror's testimony can be vital;"5 where no prejudice is
found, the result is frequently determined by the judge's assessment of the
gravity of the misconduct,8 a judgment which presently exceeds the ju-
ror's capacity. 1 Even where Rule 606(b) is found to render the juror's
testimony incompetent, the testimony is still routinely employed to demon-
strate that the exclusion does not protect a flawed verdict.8,
Despite these applications, and despite an ostensible concern for pre-
serving the jury system, little attention has been paid to the possibility of
employing jurors to control their own misconduct. Part of the difficulty
may be the emphasis on deliberations. No-impeachment rule jurispru-
dence inherits the traditional assumption of the importance of delibera-
tions to the jury's fact-finding function,' and in turn assumes that the
fact-finding function is the most important element of jury duty.90 The
focus on using the law of evidence to control juror testimony and the ex-
tension of that law to pre-deliberations activities (for the sake of delibera-
tions) follows closely from these assumptions. Deliberations and fact-
finding, however, are perhaps the most inscrutable9' and vulnerable92
components of the jury system. Juries may also be defended for perform-
ing less benighted functions, such as preserving a popular legislative func-
tion, educating citizens in government, and checking the excesses and vul-
606(b).
Juror responsibility has been assumed to the point where complaining jurors may virtually waive
their concerns by waiting too long to report them. Jacobson v. Henderson, 765 F. 2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.
1985) (jury failed to report chair throwing incident to judge before verdict).
85. See, e.g., Rinker v. County of Napa, 724 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1983) (trial court
reversed where presumed prejudice from plaintiff's contact with juror compounded by decision of
jurors not to notify court and failure of witnessing counsel and U.S. Marshall to report contact).
86. See, e.g., Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2750 (1987) (evidence of misconduct insufficient to establish
juror incompetence warranting exception to Rule 606(b)); United States v. Spurlock, 811 F.2d 1461
(11th Cir. 1987) (advice from juror's mother to consider all sides before deciding held improper but
harmless).
87. See infra notes 98-99 (lack of timely jury instructions pertaining to misconduct).
88. See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1985) (testi-
mony of partially deaf juror neither competent under Rule 606(b) nor of magnitude suggesting viola-
tion of constitutional rights).
89. But see H. KAI.VEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 489 (1966) (outcome deter-
mined before deliberations); R. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 63 (1980)
(study indicated "in slightly more than one out of three juries the group verdicts differed from those
which the jurors would have reported if they were polled immediately following the trial").
90. See Joiner, From the Bench, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 146 (R. Simon ed. 1975)
("the greatest value of the jury is its ability to decide cases correctly"); Erlanger, Jury Research in
America: Its Past and Future, 4 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 345, 345 (1970) (same).
91. See J. GUINTHER, supra note 50, at xvi-xviii (researchers' lack of access to jury delibera-
tions); V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 52, at 98-99 (same); Baldwin & McConville, supra note
17, at 238 (same).
92. See P. DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 56 (1984) (lack of control
over deliberations "may account for continuing jury system criticism"); H. KALVEN, JR. & H.
ZEISEL, supra note 89, at 3-9 (brief history of "deep controversy" over jury, especially "fascinating
but bitter" debate over jury competency); S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON
TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 3-4 (1988) (one of two most significant arguments over mer-
its of jury concerns their effectiveness); Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their
Verdicts, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 781, 782-83 (1979) ("One of the most serious criticisms of the jury
bears on the competence of its members to decide issues of fact.").
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nerabilities of the judiciary.9" While the value of each of these functions is
open to question, 4 every function of the jury, including those promoted by
insulating deliberations and improving fact-finding, may be enhanced by a
system which more fully realizes the potential of jurors in controlling
misconduct.
IV. COMPLEMENTING EVIDENTIAL INCOMPETENCE: MECHANISMS
FOR REDUCING OR RESOLVING JUROR MISCONDUCT DURING TRIAL
A comprehensive resolution of juror misconduct would preserve jury se-
crecy and the finality of verdicts, yet allow complementary exceptions for
pre-deliberations verdict impeachment and meaningful mechanisms for
ensuring that jurors prevent the risks of impeachment. Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, such a resolution would begin before deliberations, bordering and
complementing the evidentiary system's limited competence to decide the
incompetence of jurors.
A. Informing Misconduct Reporting
The Federal Rules of Evidence were criticized at their inception for
failing to take account of the interests of jurors. 5 Rule 606(b) seems sus-
ceptible to this criticism: not only does it effectively quash all post-verdict
juror reporting of misconduct, but it may first manifest itself after trial,
catching jurors unawares. Instructing the jury at the beginning of trial on
Rule 606(b) is a minimal gesture, but it would inform the conscientious
juror of the court's constraints and facilitate notifying court officers of
misconduct before deliberations, when they could be informed of the mis-
conduct and its effects.9"
A necessary accompaniment would be an instruction describing the
proper conduct of petit jurors and warning against common types of mis-
conduct, such as harassment of other jurors, alcohol or drug use, exposure
93. See P. DEVLIN, supra note 1, at 158-65; C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 24-25
(1962); H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, supra note 89, at 1; 1 A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 274-75 (J. Mayer ed. 1969); Broeder, supra note 53, passim; Jacobsohn, Citizen Partici-
pation in Policy-Making: The Role of the Jury, 39 J. POL. 73, 74 (1977); Van Dyke, The Jury as a
Political Institution, 16 CATH. LAw. 224 (1970).
94. Compare, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *350 (jury "palladium" of English liber-
ties) and THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 499 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (representing view
that jury is "very palladium of free government") with J. FRANK, supra note 5, at 108 ("palladium
... also is the name of a chemical element which, in the spongy state 'has the remarkable quality of
absorbing up to nearly 1,000 times its own volume in hydrogen gas.' "), ch. 8.
95. See Hearings, supra note 33, at 198 (letter from Professor Kenneth W. Graham). See gener-
ally London School of Economics Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L.
REV. 208, 208 (strict evidence rules developed without regard to jury behavior).
96. Full information might lift the veil of ignorance supposed earlier and chill deliberations, since
jurors would be confronted with the possibility that their behavior during deliberations could lead to
reprisals by other jurors. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text. This risk would be mini-
mized if jurors were simultaneously informed of the importance of reporting misconduct before delib-
erations, as this Note proposes.
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to out-of-court facts (by experimentation, research, or inadvertence), or
nondisclosure of bias, prejudice, or conflict.97 Although some of this mis-
conduct could be used to impeach a verdict under the explicit exceptions
to Rule 606(b), it is best to redress all types of misconduct before deliber-
ations, including when the juror is not at fault but has been compromised
by a third party.
Present instructions are inadequate. Not only does the bulk of jury in-
struction occur after trial,98 but it tends to pay little attention to the pros-
pect of juror misconduct, particularly misconduct which does not involve
extraneous information or outside influences.99 Pre-trial instruction and
encouragement of reporting might prevent or expose pre-deliberations
misconduct before a verdict is reached, thus enhancing jury secrecy, final-
ity, and justice for the parties in the case.' 00
Should pre-trial instruction result in the revelation of juror misconduct
before a verdict is reached, a federal court may accept a stipulation by the
parties reducing the number of jurors,' 0 ' allow a verdict to be returned by
eleven jurors if it finds it necessary to excuse a juror after the jury re-
tires,10 2 or impanel alternate jurors prior to deliberations. 3 Coupled with
the pre-instruction of jurors, each mechanism would allow trial courts to
nullify the effect of juror misconduct while avoiding the disruption, delay,
and expense'0 4 of disturbing verdicts.
97. See supra note 18 (sources schematizing misconduct claims). Providing a precise definition of
"misconduct" may be an enterprise doomed to failure. See NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, INC., supra
note 18, § 8.1, at 151 ("a good, working definition of 'infinite' is 'the number of ways jurors can
engage in misconduct' ").
98. See FED. R. GRIM. P. 30; FED. R. Civ. P. 51; A. ELWARK, B. SALES, & J. ALFINI, MAKING
JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE § 1-4(B) (1982); J. FREDERICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE
AMERICAN JURY § 7-502 (1987); S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 92, at 144-46; Com-
ment, Memory, Magic, and Myth: The Timing of Jury Instructions, 59 OR. L. REv. 451, 461-69
(1981).
99. See E. DEvrrr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS §§ 10.01,
10.09, 10.14, 10.18 (3d ed. Supp. 1986) (pre-trial instructions for criminal cases), §§ 70.01, 70.12
(4th ed. 1987) (pre-trial instructions for civil cases); Comment, supra note 98; see also HANDBOOK
FOR JURORS SERVING IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT (1975) (manual for prospective
jurors).
100. See A. ELWORK, B. SAKS, & J. ALFINI, supra note 98, § 1-4(B) (instructions at beginning of
trial more effective in altering perceptions and decisions of jurors); J. FREDERICK, supra note 98, § 7-
502 (same); S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 92, at 144-46 (same); Sand & Reiss, A
Report on Seven Experiments Conducted By District Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60
N.Y.U.L. REV. 423, 437-53 (1985) (successful experiment with pre-trial instruction).
101. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b); FED. R. CIv. P. 48; see, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 744 F.2d
1065, 1068 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 917 (1983).
102. FED. R. GRIM. P. 23(b).
103. Without alternate jurors, a mistrial may be necessitated in the event of multiple misconduct,
since the court may only unilaterally reduce the jury to eleven. FED. R. GRIM. P. 23(b) (reduction of
jurors); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c) (alternate jurors); FED. R. CIV. P. 47(b) (same); see, e.g., Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 512 n.31 (1978) (recommending use of alternate juror to replace biased
juror); United States v. Reyes, 645 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981) (substitution of alter-
nate jurors to cure misconduct).
104. Maintaining alternate jurors may be shunned for budgetary reasons. See Statistical Analysis
and Reports Division, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1987 Grand and Petit Juror
[Vol. 98: 187
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B. Deterring Misconduct
Juror misconduct might be further discouraged by penalizing juror mis-
behavior, perhaps by adopting the sanctions levied on third parties for
interference with the panel."' 5 Citing individuals for contempt of court,
for example, has been advocated in other contexts as a more direct means
of deterring misconduct than that available through enforcement of the
rules of evidence.106
While use of the contempt power against jurors has been limited, jurors
have been punished for misconduct involving obvious falsification of voir
dire1 7 or disobedience of court instructions."0 8 Enhancing jury pre-
instruction may ultimately permit use of the contempt power, but the cur-
rent limitations may reflect the difficulty of adapting contempt to the jury.
Contempt is a procedurally cumbersome means of deterring misconduct,
since its potential severity may affect juror reporting l 9 and requires pro-
Service in United States District Courts 18-19 (routine use of alternate jurors characterized as "ad-
verse factor" affecting efficiency of juror management). Such a policy would be consonant with the
general budgetary vulnerability of jury expenditures. See, e.g., Comment, Congressional Underap-
propriation for Civil Juries: Responding to the Attack on a Constitutional Guarantee, 55 U. CHI. L.
REv. 237, 237-39 (1988) (deficiency in federal civil jury budget for fiscal year 1986 likely to occur
again due to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act); Civil Jury Trials Ending in U.S. Courts, Nat'l L.J.,
June 23, 1986, at 3, col. 1 (shortfall in federal budget caused indefinite halt to new civil jury trials).
Closer examination would reveal the potential savings in expanding the use of alternate jurors: juror
fees are scarcely munificent, infra note 117; jury size may have little relation to trial costs, see J.
GUINTHER, supra note 50, at 76-77 (1988); and entire retrials may be avoided by their employment,
see United States v. Thompson, 744 F.2d at 1068 (alternate jurors as alternative to expense of mistri-
als or tolerance of misconduct).
105, See Campbell, Jury Secrecy and Contempt of Court, 11 MONASH U.L. REV. 169 (1985)
(discussing use of contempt to reinforce jury secrecy). See generally R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT
POWER (1963) (describing purpose and limitations of contempt power); Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A
Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183 (1971) (same).
106. For example, contempt citations might be used as an alternative to the exclusionary rule in
search-and-seizure doctrine. See Comment, Contempt of Court As an Alternative to the Exclusionary
Rule, 72 J. CRtM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 993 (1981). Professor Crump's attempt at a more comprehen-
sive comparison between Rule 606(b) and search-and-seizure doctrine strains the analogy and side-
steps the considerable criticism of Leon's vision of the Fourth Amendment. Compare Crump, supra
note 5, at 536-39 with Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986).
107. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933); Matter of Brogdon, 625 F. Supp. 422
(W.D. Ark. 1985) (juror convicted of criminal contempt for failure to disclose knowledge of case
during voir dire); see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 135 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (juror
allegedly committing perjury during voir dire threatened by trial judge with criminal prosecution);
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 230 n.6 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing N.Y. Penal Law §§
195.05, 215.20, 215.[301 (McKinney 1975)) (jurors engaged in conscious misconduct may be liable
under New York law for obstructing governmental administration, accepting bribes, or promising
vote). Use of criminal contempt against jurors in federal courts is apparently limited to perjury. See
Bays v. Petan Co. of Nevada, 94 F.R.D. 587, 591 (D. Nev. 1982) (while Rule 606(b) does not apply
to criminal contempt proceedings, criminal contempt is only established by knowing and willful con-
cealment or false swearing).
108. See, e.g., People v. Rosenthal, 370 Ill. 244, 18 N.E.2d 450 (1938). Cf State v. Jester, Nat'l
L.J., March 5, 1984, at 10, col. 1 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga County, Feb. 16, 1984) (judge threatens with
contempt juror accused of intimidating other jurors during deliberations, telling him to bring "a law-
yer and a toothbrush" to court).
109. Collegial jurors may become less likely to report misconduct by one another, while hostile
jurors may be tempted to report misconduct falsely.
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cedural safeguards which may ultimately increase disclosure.11 Moreover,
the deterrent effect of contempt sanctions relies on the existence of a rea-
sonably coherent, responsive institution like the police or the bar,"' a
description at loggerheads with the intended diversity of jury pools.112 Fi-
nally, use of contempt sanctions against jurors may provoke a backlash
from citizens frustrated by the burdens of jury duty. 1 3
A more moderate sanction would accommodate the limited responsibili-
ties and rewards entailed by jury duty. While liability may be the begin-
ning of responsibility, or even coextensive with it," 4 subjecting jurors to
extreme penalties would exaggerate the potential deterrent and distort the
nature of jury service.115 One possible compromise would permit the judge
to withhold payment of juror fees from jurors who have been involved in
misconduct."' The preoccupation of jurors with the economic implications
of jury duty suggests that they might view such a penalty as a strong
incentive to avoid misconduct."
7
C. Reforming Proof
Beyond preventing, deterring, and controlling juror misconduct, a more
active role for jurors could improve the adjudication of misconduct claims.
Informing jurors of the contours of Rule 606(b) should make misconduct
reporting more timely, and providing guidance as to the appropriate sub-
jects for reporting should enhance the quality of petitions without swamp-
ing the courts. Improved juror education and incentives might also in-
110. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982) (contempt of court must "obstruct the administration of justice");
see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 42 (criminal contempt). Normal criminal contempt proceedings require the
standard procedural protections, such as the right to jury trial. Summary contempt proceedings, in
contrast, may only be employed in extreme circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Marra, 482 F.2d
1196 (2d Cir. 1973) (contemnor must openly threaten orderly procedure of court and flagrantly defy
person and presence of judge to warrant summary contempt).
111. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 106, at 1018-21 (contempt sanction for illegal conduct would
induce self-policing by law enforcement authorities).
112. Jury heterogeneity may be the very source of the misconduct problem. "The jury, passing on
the prisoner's life, may in the sworn twelve have a thief or two guiltier than him they try." W.
SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE (1604-1605), quoted in LEXIS Legal Pursuits, Personali-
ties category (1986 playing cards). Cf W. KELLY, IMPOLLUTABLE PoGo 128 (1970) (Porkypine, J.)
(" 'We have met the enemy and he is us.' ").
113. See, e.g., infra note 117 and accompanying text (preexisting economic burdens of jury duty);
Comment, supra note 106, at 1022-24 (severity of imposing contempt fines on police).
114. See Schrader, Responsibility and Existence, in RESPONSIBILITY: NoMos III at 43 (C. Fried-
rich ed. 1960).
115. Rather, the ideal penalty would synthesize the role-responsibility (defined by the duties of
jurors), legal liability-responsibility (defined by liability for misconduct), and capacity-responsibility
(defined by the expectations communicated by pre-instruction) of jurors. Cf H.L.A. HART, PUNISH-
MENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 212-30 (1968).
116. Such authority could be delegated under regulations promulgated by the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. See 28 U.S.C. 1871 (a), (g) (Supp. 1987).
117. See Bowles, Juries, Incentives and Self-Selection, 20 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 368, 370-75
(1980); Pabst & Munsterman, The Economic Hardship of Jury Duty, 58 JUDICATURE 494 (1975);
Richert, Jurors' Attitudes Toward Jury Service, 2 JUST. Sys. J. 233, 237-38 (1977). It may be
necessary to raise juror fees to make such a penalty meaningful. See, e.g., Jury Pittance, L.A. Daily
J., Aug. 14, 1987, at 4, col. I (juror minimum fee reduced to $5 per day).
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crease the credibility of juror testimony, thereby reducing the risk of juror
turpitude to the level of conventional witnesses.
More ambitiously, jurors should be relied upon to fulfill the delibera-
tive functions protected by Rule 606(b). Faced with extremely egregious
misconduct that cannot be remedied by the evidentiary system,"'8 it would
be appropriate for juries to exploit their power to hang and thereby nul-
lify the proceedings. This proposal is less radical than it may seem. Juries
are inevitably presented with what has been termed a "recourse role,"
consisting of the choice between literal adherence to judicial instructions
and doing what they think best. 19 In the context of pre-deliberations ju-
ror misconduct, a jury might purposefully deadlock or delay "where a
conflict exists within [its] context of evaluation,"12 namely, where it an-
ticipates intolerable damage to the jury system if the misconduct were
unconstrained.
By relying on the knowledge and perspective peculiar to jurors, and by
choosing the most modest path of juridic defiance, 21 such decisions would
avoid the broadest arguments against jury nullification. 22 The dynamic of
deliberations suggests that a hung jury will be avoided unless a minority
consensus exists for it,12 ' and the occasional cost of hung juries to finality
and judicial administration should be tolerated as a consequence of taking
the jury-promotion objective of Rule 606(b) seriously. 24
118. See, e.g., supra notes 18, 26.
119. See M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPAR-
TURES FROM LEGAL RULES 56-66 (1973) (legitimacy and coherence of interposition by jurors). This
Note does not resolve the larger issue of whether subjects licensed for jury nullification should be so
described in jury instructions. Compare id. (instructions bad) with Christie, Lawful Departure From
Legal Rules: "Jury Nullification" and Legitimated Disobedience, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1289, 1303
(1974) (nullification without instruction fatally inconsistent). For these purposes, the instructions on
Rule 606(b) and juror misconduct recommended in Section IV(A) are sufficient.
The Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence has identified a discrete problem posed by jury
nullification: Where unbridled jury discretion is thought to violate the Eighth Amendment, as in the
imposition of capital sentences, statutes liable to jury nullification may be impermissible. Compare
Sumner v. Shuman, 107 S. Ct. 2716, 2727 n.13 (1987) (commending bifurcated trials in capital cases
for avoiding nullification) and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976) (plurality
opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (mandatory death sentence statute constitutionally defi-
cient for creating frequent nullification) with id., 428 U.S. at 313 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (jury
nullification no less constitutional than jury appraisal of mitigating factors). The instant proposal may
be distinguished, however, since it does not contemplate or predict nullification of any particular
statute and would not reflect the contemporary valuation of any norms underlying statutes.
120. See M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 119, at 60-61.
121. A hung jury is not nearly as irremediable as other measures available to juries. See, e.g.,
Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51, 80-82 (jury might regard statute as unconstitutional, define or create
crime, or return lesser conviction against evidence). The appeal of the solution proposed here lies in
the fact that the jury can simultaneously affect the verdict while signaling that it has not resolved the
underlying matter. Nullification by acquittal, on the other hand, could mean that the jury chose not to
resolve the matter, could not resolve it, or resolved it negatively. A similar ambiguity attends more
conclusive forms of jury nullification in the civil context, although renewal of a civil suit faces frictions
of a lesser magnitude than double jeopardy.
122. See id. at 85-115 (summary of policy arguments regarding nullification).
123. See V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 52, at 111-12.
124. But cf. Zeisel,. . . And Then There Were None: The Dimunition of the Federal Jury, 38
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V. CONCLUSION
The jurisprudence of Rule 606(b) has been waging a losing war against
juror misconduct, a consequence of inherent and perspectival limitations.
While Rule 606(b) seems facially and functionally inapplicable to pre-
deliberations matters and statements, its extension to such testimony
reveals foundational, countervailing imperatives of proof and finality. The
resultant intractability of juror testimony and neglect of juror contribu-
tions delimit the shortcomings of the evidentiary system's dismissive image
of the jury.
Juror misconduct presents an ideal opportunity for development of a
fuller, more responsible role for jurors. Rather than merely conserving
jury deliberations through the exclusion of juror testimony, trial courts
should take advantage of the manifest involvement of jurors in policing the
jury system. By informing jurors and making them accountable for their
conduct, courts may begin the transition to a jury system that is not only
tolerable but supportive of the sundry objectives of civil and criminal
justice.
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